Figurational sociology is so often said to distance itself from the political issues of the day. Whilst this is certainly true with regards to the present day, it in no way follows that figurational sociology seeks to distance itself from politics as such. On the contrary, as will be shown within this paper, politics is and always has been a central concern for figurational sociologists. This political concern, however, is an exclusively long term concern; figurational sociology purposively postpones present political engagement for the sake of developing a sufficiently detached sociology that would eventually facilitate in the delivery of effective practical and political measures. This paper discusses the stakes involved in, as well as the reasoning behind, the assignment of such a place to politics. It gestures towards two distinct and separate concepts of social control that exist within figurational sociology and then proceeds to offer a critical consideration of the consequences that can be derived from any temporal demarcation of the political done on their basis. The paper ultimately suggests that figurational sociology's position on politics raises a series of as yet unanswered questions, questions which can no longer remain unanswered by the contemporary figurational sociologist.
Introduction
Two of sociology's characteristic concerns find immensely sophisticated expression and expansion within the work of Norbert Elias and his followers: figurational/ process sociologists. Firstly: a concern for the appropriate place that is to be given to normative evaluation within sociological investigation. Secondly: a concern for the appropriate place that is to be given to sociological investigation with respect to social policy. This paper offers a close but ultimately critical consideration of the manner in which figurational sociologists have responded to these two concerns. It will be of particular interest to those who are engaged with Elias' work. And it will be of more general interest for anyone concerned with understanding how a great sociologist, and later his followers, have groped around and grappled with such characteristically sociological concerns. The paper's argument develops across this introduction, seven core sections and a conclusion. The first of these core sections makes the case for a renewed consideration of figurational sociology's engagement with questions of the political by setting this against the background of figurational sociology's historically chequered relationship to the sociological mainstream. The following three sections then discuss and analyse figurational sociology's complex engagement with questions of the political. Within these three sections particular emphasis is placed upon how, for figurational sociology, the very possibility of any sort of social intervention is placed only upon the very distant temporal horizon. That is to say, the politics of figurational sociology, if there are ever to be any, will only ever be found in the longterm.
The next two sections of the paper then gesture towards an unresolved tension which I argue exists both within Elias's own engagement with the political and also within his followers' subsequent defence of this engagement. In this regard, on the one hand Elias makes a contentious appeal towards an immanent idea of the relationship between sociology and society. In so doing, Elias describes historically determined chains of human interdependencies in terms of their tendency towards restraint and subsequently explains the very manifestation of sociology in terms of this tendency.
That being the case, on the other hand, Elias also makes a less conspicuous but nonetheless apparent appeal towards sociology as an almost socially transcendent force. In this regard sociology is posited as a figuration of future specialists who will know more than most both about how human interdependencies work and, moreover, about how they can be made to work better. The penultimate section of the paper raises a series of questions on the basis of the discontinuity between these two accounts of sociology's relationship with society and with politics. The concluding section then calls for more debate around this discontinuity, around these questions, and around others like them.
Figurational Sociology and the Politics of Reception
Norbert Elias and his followers have long sensed the significance, even the urgency, of their figurational approach to sociology. As far back as the late 1970s Johan Goudsblom, one of the most influential figurational sociologists, took it upon himself to re-assess sociological theory as such from the viewpoint of Elias's ideas (1977a) .
Later, in what remains perhaps the definitive introduction to Eliasian sociology 1 ,
Stephen Mennell argued that Elias's work 'is intended to offer solutions to major problems of sociology and the social sciences more generally ' (1998: 251) . More recently still, Stephen Loyal and Stephen Quilley have gone so far as to insist that 'Eliasian sociology seems best placed to provide a 'central theory' not only for the social sciences, but for the human sciences more generally ' (2005a: 826) . Elias himself concurs on this point when he says:
We, my friends and I, had to toil and to labour in order to overcome the inertia of a process reducing sociology. To keep alive the memory of the not-knowing and of the struggle in which new knowledge gained the ascendency is a duty which must not be shirked. It took almost half a century before process sociology found resonance in society at large (1987b: xl) .
Something significant is at stake, therefore. Mennell admits how he 'always tended to view the promotion of his [Elias's] ideas as a kind of political campaign ' (2006: 75) .
So a crucial task for the figurational sociologists of today seems to be that of getting their message across to the widest possible audience. Mennell is by no means the sole champion of such a cause. The hugely significant project of translating Elias' complete works into an eighteen volume collection is already bearing fruit (Elias 2005a (Elias , 2005b (Elias , 2007a (Elias , 2007b (Elias , 2007c ; see also UCD Press 2008) . Extended secondary commentaries and edited collections abound (e.g. Fulbrook 2007; Dunning et. al. 2006; Loyal and Quilley 2004; van Iterson et. al. 2002; Salumets 2002; Smith 2000; Dunning 1999; Goudsblom and Mennell 1998; Mennell 1998; van Krieken 1998; Fletcher 1997; and Dunning and Rojek 1992) .
A four-volume Masters of Modern
Social Thought series has been dedicated to Elias's work (Dunning and Mennell 2003) 2 .
Figurational sociology, on this cursory reading at least, is being pushed further and further towards centre stage of the English speaking sociological world. Yet figurational sociology has often been said to be upon this very cusp of centrality: very often and not only recently. Over three decades ago, for example, Goudsblom's comprehensive overview of the reception of Elias' work was written against the background of the 'intriguing ' (1977b: 38) fact of its then relative obscurity. Over twenty years ago, Dennis Smith proceeded to make the point that 'Elias is no longer an outsider ' (1984: 386) whilst three years later Mike Featherstone suggested that Elias's work 'now shows signs of gaining the attention and acknowledgment it has long deserved ' (1987: 197 Kilminster ultimately identifies 'the unavailability in translation of his major works for so long ' (1987: 213-214) as the most decisive factor. Elsewhere Goudsblom (1977b: 39) suggests that the manner in which Elias's work has resonated in different ways around the world is itself a sociological issue requiring sociological investigation 3 .
In as much as it has been said that the sociological mainstream has been somewhat hesitant or hostile towards an engagement with figurational sociology, even to this date, it has also been said that figurational sociology has at times been guilty of responding in kind. For Johann Arnason, the distinctiveness of the figurational approach to sociology can itself 'be clarified in terms of a systematic opposition to components and variants of a dominant paradigm ' (1987: 431) . Similarly Goudsblom suggests that even as far back as Elias's very early essay on kitsch (1935/1998) we find expressed certain 'features that have characterized Elias's subsequent writings, beginning with The Civilizing Process. One typical feature was a certain disdain for scholastic disputation ' (1977b: 75/1986: 325) . Elias, for his part, has attempted to defend his idiosyncratic reluctance to engage with his contemporaries by saying:
it is more productive for the future of sociology if I go on working in the laboratory as I have done before, like a physicist who would go to his labour every day and do his stint instead of criticizing other physicists (Elias, c.f. Kilminster 1987: 215) .
Such a disposition has led many figures towards making the criticism that Elias, and later his followers, tend to make something akin to a straw man of a variety of alternative/competing theoretical sociological positions (e.g. Coser, 1979 , Horne and Jary, 1987 and Layder, 1986 , a criticism which Featherstone (1987: 200) says, 'has an element of truth'. The interchange between Maso (1995b , 1995b ), Goudsblom (1995 and Kilminster and Wouters (1995) , on the subject of the role given to Kantian philosophy within figurational sociology, is truly exemplary in this regard. As Dick Pels (1991: 179) forcibly remarks, when it comes to figurational sociology:
Intellectual competition is basically considered a waste of time, and a lowly occupation; the defence of tribe and turf is undertaken reluctantly and only if provoked (but then no quarter is given). By this sovereign aloofness, 'process sociology', as it prefers to be called, thus effectively reduces the complexity of the outside intellectual world 4 .
This seeming reluctance of figurational sociologists to engage with alternative schools of sociological thought is no doubt also what Eric Dunning and Stephen Mennell have in mind when they argue:
A recurrent criticism of Elias and his 'school' over the years has been that we are, in effect, a 'sect' and that we 'celebrate' and 'worship' Elias, a charismatic figure, and his work, rather than criticising and testing it. There may, of course, be some 'Eliasians' whose behaviour is something sect-like in this way just as there are sect-like Marxists, Parsonians and Foucauldians. However, we suspect that this sort of criticism stems at least in part from the refusal of 'core Elisians' to accept manifestly false interpretations of Elias such as that he was an 'evolutionary' or 'progress' theorist. (2003: xxxii) [Emphasis added]
The tendency of figurational sociologists to point towards and undermine such manifestly false interpretations of Elias (e.g. Dunning and Mennell 1979; Dunning 1992; Dunning 1989; Dunning 1996; Mennell and Goudsblom 1997; Dunning and Mennell 1998; Mennell 1998: 227-250; Loyal and Quilley 2005b) surely informs the notion that an Eliasian 'sect' exists. Nevertheless, that there is a campaign seeking to promote Elias's work is not and cannot be understood as a deficiency of the work itself. Too often, the idea that there is an Eliasian 'sect' gets in the way of the ideas themselves, thereby blocking sympathetic and systematic access to them. There is, in other words, always something quite trivial about every single 'are you/we for or against the ideas of theorist x?' discussion. In this respect both Dennis Layder (1994: 115) and Nico Mouzelis (1993) advocate the bypassing of such superficial tit-for-tatism in favour of analysing how Elias's work is both connected to and disconnected from the sociological canon. This means that attention should be paid not so much towards the sociologists as towards the sociology, not towards the sociology of figurational sociolo-gists (in the sense of what brought and keeps them together) but towards the sociology of figurational sociolo-gy (in the sense of the work bearing that name).
Following such a lead, this paper discusses a compelling tension that I argue exists within Elias's work. I do this by interrogating the manner in which some of the principles it lays down stand as the greatest barriers to that which it otherwise seeks to achieve. The intention here, to be clear, is neither to 'promote' nor 'refute' figurational sociology. Instead, I will follow both Alan Sica's suggestion that Elias can be overcome only after his work has been sufficiently engaged (1984) and Johann Arnason's (1987: 429) demonstration of how one might argue 'with Elias against Elias'. In so doing, I intend to work with figurational sociology upon its own terms, as it were, in order to develop some of the consequences of these. In particular, it will be my central contention that figurational sociology denies itself the very thing which it hopes to eventually achieve -a sociology that would one day help to bring social processes under more conscious control (Elias 2000: xiv) .
This is not to leave the opening theme of the politics of figurational sociology's reception behind, however. The discussion began with the theme of the politics behind figurational sociology. It continues with an extended discussion of politics within the writings of figurational sociology. And it concludes by connecting the scenario of the former with the consequences derived from the latter.
The Spiralling Difficulty of Detachment
[I]f social scientists, although using more specialised procedures and a more technical language, are in the last resort not much less affected in their approach to the problems of society by preconceived ideas and ideals, by passions and partisan views, than the man in the street, are they really justified in calling themselves scientists?...Can social scientists make any specific contribution to the solution of major problems, even of their own groups, of their own country, class, profession or whatever it is, if they accept as the selfevident foundation of their theories some of the religiously held creeds and norms of one or the other of these groups, so that the results of their studies are destined from the start to agree, or at least not to disagree, with the basic tenets of these communal beliefs? (Elias 1987b: 15) It is clear from the above quotation that Elias wanted social science to be scientific.
By this I mean that for Elias, common sense opinions and partisan knowledge claims were the highest hurdles to be jumped on the way towards a properly scientific social science. Chris Rojek argues that such a de-prioritization of the political in the name of and for the sake of a scientific sociology 'illustrates the main reasons for the mixed reaction to Elias's work' (1986: 594) . Responding to this charge of political quietism, Eric Dunning explains how the apparently apolitical nature of Elias's work was itself a product of his desire to develop a body of sociological knowledge that would give deeper insight into the processual dynamics of political crises (Rojek, 2004: 342-343 Elias argues elsewhere that:
The sociologist should not be required or expected to express his convictions about how society ought to develop. Sociologists ought rather to free themselves from the notion that there is or even will be any necessary correspondence between the society they are investigating and their own social beliefs, their wishes and hopes, their moral predilections or their conceptions of what is just and humane (1978: 153).
All of this being the case, the specificity of this particular challenge is heightened by the fact that sociologists participate within the facts they study: they themselves are organs of the very body they seek to observe. Elias is fully aware of fact that any sociologist, figurational or otherwise, 'cannot cease to take part in, and to be affected by, the social and political affairs of their groups and their time ' (1987b: 16) . Not only that. Elias shows that whenever the political situation within which the sociologist operates becomes particularly intense or dangerous, during a war for example, an unexamined emotional response will become all the more likely, hence furthermore jeopardising the accuracy of the account. Elias calls this continuity of oughts a double-bind: emotional responses spiral out of control, thereby blocking the very possibility of the detached stance that would be capable of grounding them to a halt.
On this he says:
High emotivity of response lessens the chance of a realistic assessment of the critical process and, hence, of a realistic practice in relation to it; relatively unrealistic practice under the pressure of strong affects lessens the chance of bringing the critical process under control (1987b: 48) .
This observation doesn't come as some sort of afterthought to Elias's theory of knowledge (most clearly articulated within his Involvement and Detachment); it rather acts as a foundation for it. Elias shows how the sociologist is intimately involved within the very thing they must otherwise eventually detach themselves from. And, as will be shown in the next section of this paper, it is in his discussion of autonomous and heteronomous values that Elias attempts to simultaneously overcome both the somewhat positivist notion that sociology should become a 'value-free' science and the avowedly pluralist notion that values, as inevitable, should be worn upon every sociological sleeve.
Acceptable and Unacceptable Values
[E]very scientific endeavor has moral implications. Instead of distinguishing between two types of science, one of which is "value-free" while the other is not, one may find it both simpler and more apposite to distinguish in scientific pronouncements between two types of evaluations, one autonomous, the other heteronomous, of which one or the other may be dominant (Elias, 1956: 229) .
This section explains how the above quotation can be understood as a response to the difficulty of double-bind processes discussed in the previous section. This explanation will in turn lead the way towards a discussion of how Elias argues that sociology might still be considered practically useful, despite the continuously asserted requirement for evaluative detachment.
As we have seen, the starting point for much of what Elias says on the place of sociological evaluation is that the sociologist is always implicated within a politicosocial situation. Indeed, Elias argues that a sociologists' own involvement in the social world 'is itself one of the conditions for comprehending the problems they try to solve as scientists ' (1987b: 16) . It is for this reason that he makes a distinction between autonomous and heteronomous values. Elias' 'autonomous' values are those which access, and to a large extent structure, the object(s) with which any field of study concerns itself (the 'value' of achieving demonstrable observations in the case of the human and natural sciences or the 'value' of explaining the evolution of webs of human figurations in the case of sociology, for example). This is why Goudsblom argues (1977b why Goudsblom argues ( : 81/1986 : 333) that throughout his work, Elias is evaluating -on the basis that the highest professional value for a sociologist is to provide more adequate knowledge of the social world, knowledge which will have the practical significance that it will enable us to act more realistically than we do today. This, in Elias's view, is the central task confronting sociologists: to break out of the confines of short-term, groupcentred fantasy thinking, and to discover more realistic means of orientation…this task should be conceived of not in a definitive, but in a developmental sense: as an effort to reduce the fanciful and increase the realistic elements in our thinking about societies. ? (1978) , investigative fields can be distinguished from one another on the basis of the institutionally legitimated autonomous values that they hold as their own. Such values create autonomy on the part of a field of investigation. To say that a field has autonomous values is only to say that it has various standards and procedures which its practitioners observe and uphold -there is nothing perversely subjectivist or relativist in any of this. The success and strength of an intellectual field, social scientific or otherwise, is hence to be found, for Elias, in its ability to achieve a level of 'relative autonomy' from other fields on three ascending levels. Firstly, relative autonomy with respect to the nature of its subject matter. Secondly, relative autonomy with respect to the manner in which that subject matter is accessed. Finally, relative autonomy with respect to the manner in which this relatively autonomous subject matter is institutionally legitimated and perpetuated within and across various research programmes and formalised pedagogies (Elias 1978: 59) .
As Elias himself puts it within What is Sociology
In opposition to these autonomous values which go towards constituting the strength of a field of enquiry, Elias posits 'extra-scientific, heteronomous valuations ' (1987b: 34-35) which, he argues, are always to the detriment of a field of enquiry insofar as it makes claims towards the value of its enquiries. In order to demonstrate this point, he
poses the example of a doctor treating an epidemic or fighting cancer. Certainly, the doctor may well feel a profound empathy towards their patients. Indeed, the empathic will to help the sick may well be the primary reason why so many doctors become doctors in the first place. Nevertheless, the ability to treat patients will not come from the doctors' empathy alone. On the contrary, the very therapeutic ability sought will rather come from the doctors' own ability to detach themselves from emotional responsiveness, thereby more fully involving themselves in the study of the facts of the given illness. Certainly, it is medical science that constitutes these facts as facts.
But for Elias, this does not make these facts any less real. As he argues:
What we call "science" is merely an expression of people's ability to break the hold of the double-bind process in their relationships with inanimate nature, to lower, at the same time, the fantasy level of their knowledge, the danger level of natural events, and thus to put the double-bind process into reverse gear (1987b: 98).
The doctor, in other words, is in the best position to treat the patient when s/he is detached from any evaluation of the way in which ill people should be (i. Elias insists that until heteronomous values are sufficiently pacified, it will never be possible to put the social sciences to the service of that which they attempt to understand. Elias' extended and at times ill-tempered criticism of what he calls 'the new deductionists' proliferating within the social sciences is not only that they are wrong to see things otherwise. More seriously, his criticism picks up on the fact that these 'new deductionists' are doubly wrong: they see no problem in allowing heteronomous values to take free reign (1984: 217-220) . Much in the way that the cosmologist is not required to have a view on divinity, although they are fully entitled towards such views, Elias insists that the sociologist must strive to show how society works without expressing how they feel it should work. To quote Elias once more:
The stronger the hold of involved forms of thinking, and thus of the inability to distance oneself from traditional attitudes, the stronger the danger inherent in the situation created by peoples traditional attitudes towards each other and towards themselves. The greater the danger the more difficult it is for people to look at themselves, at each other and at the whole situation with a measure of detachment (1987b: xiv).
Figurational sociology therefore attempts to lift sociology out of various magicomythical structures of thought towards more reality congruent appreciations of the world. The Comteian undertones are intentional. Sociology denies itself the potential to properly understand and subsequently describe social processes of human interdependencies for as long as it relies upon presuppositions that simply do not stand up to the test of empirical evidence. For as long as sociology is content to buttress itself upon theological and/or metaphysical (read: heteronomous)
foundations, it refuses itself the ability to even set sail on its voyage. For Elias, the sociological Odyssey therefore steers along very treacherous surroundings, sailing 'between the Scylla of physics and the Charybdis of metaphysics ' (1978: 22, 166) , 'between the Scylla of "staticism"…and the Charybdis of the "historical relativism"
which sees in history only constant transformation ' (2000: xii) and 'between the Scylla of positivism and the Charybdis of apriorism ' (2000: 471) .
The epic journey, riddled with obstacles, is made more difficult still by thoughts clouded in the dense fog of moral judgment, by so many 'oughts' masquerading as 'ises'. Elias saw the sociologist as a destroyer of myths (1978: 50-70 ) and as such, if s/he is to be capable of fulfilling such a mandate, s/he must work only upon solid and sensible (i.e. non-mythical) foundations. Elias's explicitly pronounced Comteian indebtedness is hence to his notion of sociology as a relatively autonomous science.
Whilst Comte is said to have failed in empirically verifying this insight, he is said to be commendable for having succinctly stated the problem of sociology, a problem still currently in search of a convincing solution (1978: 33-47) . As Elias argues elsewhere:
Neither physicists nor philosophers so far recognise the distinct order of human beings, which we call societies, as an order with structures and regularities of its own, as a semi-autonomous level of the Universe. To establish this fact requires a struggle against many established views and against the groups of people who are the holders of these established views (1982: 67).
The current campaign for figurational sociology might best be understood in terms of this continuing struggle. It is not only sociologists that stand to gain from success in this regard, but, it is claimed, society as such, as the following sections of this paper will go on to show. As the later sections of this paper will also show, however, this claim is not very well supported, despite the best efforts and intentions of many contemporary figurational sociologists.
The Eventually Engaged Policy of Present Non-Engagement
Up to this point, we have identified the main reasons as to why figurational sociology scorns the pronounced temptation and, perhaps, the prominent tendency for sociologists to adopt an evaluative stance towards the political affairs of the day. Yet we are by no means entitled to conclude from this partial reading that figurational sociology is therefore apolitical as such. Indeed, as Mennell (1977: 106) suggests, the opposite is in fact the case:
Underlying all Elias's writings, even those apparently least concerned with mundane practical problems, is a moral commitment to the calling of sociology and a belief that to understand the compelling nature of blind social processes is to increase the chances of controlling them. Returning to our earlier example, it was not empathy that treated the patient but its suspension: the sympathetic doctor was best able to realize the intention to cure by resorting to a state of disinterest. By going through such apathy, the doctor's prior empathy was given the greatest chance of being meaningfully realized. The patient was best served in the process. In Elias's words, the doctor took a 'detour via detachment ' (1987b: 9, 35-36; see also Kilminster 1993: 92-3 knowledge to use -not a moment before. For now, the exact nature of these interventions is not a concern nor should it even be borne in mind; the present task is to achieve a properly sociological investigative and explicative orientation.
Figurational sociology is not a project launched at the absolute expense of any political vision, therefore. What many consider to be its political silence might best be explained in terms of the patience it has to say something eventually, but only when the time is right; a concern to not propose the under-examined, to not promote the unproven and to not speak without the authority of certainty. Espoused for now is a sort of engagement by removal, a postponed political participation and the firm promise of a politics to come, at some stage, in the long term.
It is in this sense that Kilminster suggests that the figurational sociologist's political passion might for now be channeled into and expressed through the work he or she does (2004: 33) . This would be to convert figurational sociology into a vocation. This is indeed the suggestion. Motivated by its patience for a politics to come, figurational sociology works forward with purpose, strengthened by the confidence that it will one day arrive at the point of being prepared to say something politically and morally definitive, in the long term. For now, however, the will to become involved is suspended, through the detour via detachment, and is instead placed at the vocational level. The figurational sociologist thereby becomes deeply involved in their work, for the sake of the politics that might one day come, adopting a disposition which Elias calls secondary involvement (1987b: lii).
Figurational sociologists admit that such a transition will not be easily had. A significant challenge lies ahead 7 . One need only consider the dynamics of double-bind scenarios, as Elias himself does (1987b: 99) , to recognize the inherent difficulty of even suggesting the inauguration, not to mention the following through, of any project which would hope to successfully detour via detachment. For now, we cannot know where the detour via detachment will take us, nor do we know whether a sufficient number of people are prepared to take such a detour. Nevertheless, for as long as unknowns such as these remain unknown to us, figurational sociology's eventual political affiliations will also. This is a questionable position. Before arguing why it is questionable, I will first of all lay the final foundations for my argument by alluding towards two distinct and separate ways in which figurational sociology has discussed social processes with respect to control. On the one hand there exists an empirically derived, retrospectively focused understanding of control. Control, in this sense, is a general affair which social scientists can make no special claims towards. On the other hand, there exists an understanding of control which is speculatively derived and prospectively focused.
Control, in this sense, is a general affair whilst also being something which the social scientist possesses special knowledge about.
Control as a Socially Prevalent, Really Existing Force
For anybody that has ever taken even so much as a passing interest in the writings of figurational sociologists, the first understanding of control requires little introduction. The issue is not one of kind but rather one of degree. As Elias argues:
There is no zero-point of civilizing processes, no point at which human beings are uncivilized and as it were begin to be civilized. No human being lacks the capacity for self-restraint. No human group could function for any length of time whose adults failed to develop, within the wild and at first totally unrestrained little beings, as which humans are born, patterns of selfregulation and self-restraint (see also Wouters 1987 Wouters , 1986 9 . This term designates the sort of scenario wherein individuals become so aware of the existence of formal or implicit constraints upon their own behavior, and the behavior of those with whom they are associating, that the rules which usually govern 'civilized' behavior become gradually relaxed.
Competitive sport, as Elias and Dunning (1986) The result of this being that for Kilminster, Mannheim's model of control implies a 'perhaps greater authoritarianism than he probably would have admitted ' (1993: 104) .
As Kilminster puts it in more forthright terms still:
Elias did not share Mannheim's commitment of sociology to the guiding of practical measures to effect changes in the wider society, within the tradition of liberalism. Rather, he took a longer-term view and had a more circumspect attitude towards the possibilities of controlling blind social forces through planning (1993: 83).
The mentioning of this 'more circumspect attitude' paves the way towards a discussion of figurational sociology's second understanding of control with which I am presently concerned. Whilst it is of course the case that the emphasis of figurational sociology has traditionally been upon the demarcation of the limits of control, rather than the establishment and maintenance of it, there are also various occasions where figurational sociology nonetheless insists upon a certain notion of social planning which is undertaken by specialists. It is towards an elaboration upon the significance of occasions like these which this paper now turns.
Control as a Socially Stratified, Spectrally Possible Force
As has been already argued, figurational sociologists believe that it is crucial to eventually adopt a politically facilitative role. This politically facilitative role cannot be adopted just yet, however. The facts are simply not yet ready to hand. A sustained period of evaluative detachment and patient sociological investigation are required in order to bring them about. Any worthwhile social policy can be derived only out of these facts. Such a factually derived social policy, for its part, will eventually be oriented towards achieving better control over networks of human interdependencies.
Or, to reassert in the language of figurational sociology: sociology, having eventually become a relatively more autonomous discipline, having taken a prolonged detour via detachment, on the basis of a generalized commitment to a state of secondary involvement, will fulfill its evaluative promise by aiding the achievement of the end of control. Elias maintains this position throughout his work:
Perhaps by understanding better the compelling forces at work in a configuration such as that of the established and the outsiders one may in time be able to devise practical measures capable of controlling them [Emphasis added] (Elias and Scotson, 1994: 173) .
The task of sociological research is to make these blind, uncontrolled processes more accessible to human understanding by explaining them, and to enable people to orientate themselves within the interwoven social webwhich, though created by their own needs and actions, is still opaque to themand so better to control it [Emphasis in the original] (Elias, 1978: 154 Clearly there is a need in contemporary societies for specialists who explore social processes, who fill in the gaps in our knowledge of the changing social universe, and who expose disguised mythologies…Until now, no group has managed to come into its own as a professional group with sufficiently developed institutional safeguards against the intrusion of heteronomous evaluations (1977b: 83/1987: 335) .
It is clear that the sociologist, more precisely the sociologist of the future, is given a privileged place within these writings. Irrespective of whether the issue is control or the facilitation of control, it is an issue for the eventually existing sociological specialist. These specialists will eventually achieve a standpoint from which they can get a better view of social processes. Accordingly, they will be both those who really know the potential controllability of social processes and also those who should be prioritized within any discussion of social control. These specialists, these social scientists of the future, will eventually be in a position to 'solve the acute problems of society' and to 'devise practical measures capable of controlling them'. Nowhere does Elias argue that the human capacity towards self-restraint is a product of sociology.
But it seems that the sociologists of the future will eventually become producers of just this form of practical knowledge. This is a promise which figurational sociology has made, a promise which its specialists will seemingly deliver upon in time.
Such an understanding of control is not at all easily squared with the understanding of control outlined in the previous section. There, control was a descriptive phenomenon derived out of empirical observation. Here, control is a prescriptive phenomenon derived out of self-confident speculation. There, control was a capacity ascertainable by human beings in general. Here, control is something ascertainable by the sociologist of the future. There, control was an equitably distributed privilege of human beings as such. Here, control is a privilege towards which specialist intellectuals will eventually become entitled. These two separate concepts of control are in no way complimentary. On the contrary, as I will show in the following section, one notion undermines the other: control cannot be consistently understood both
ways. I will demonstrate why this is the case by raising a series of related questions to which figurational sociology has yet to offer any satisfactory answers.
Questioning the Politics of Control

The Harmonization Question
We know that figurational sociology offers a long term, process oriented understanding of control. Furthermore, we also know from figurational sociologists that control is not to be understood in absolute terms but rather in relative terms, that control isn't simply a matter of coercion and that individuals have gradually developed the capacity for self-restraint. But at the same time, we are also told that social scientists might eventually be in a position to aid, perhaps even direct social processes, towards particular ends. As Stephen Mennell once said
Somewhere in The Civilizing Process Elias speculates that the potential for planning social life is increasing…but the general implication of the game models runs against that: there is certainly room for further discussion here (1987: 560).
For the sake of furthering this discussion, the first question I would like to ask is the following: how can the assertion that individuals have the capacity for self-restraint be squared with the assertion that social scientists will eventually be in a position to help, have the capacity towards self-restraint) and that more control is needed (in the sense that social scientists will eventually help effectuate appropriate measures towards control). It is not at all clear at present how the latter concept of control is in any way harmonious with the former.
The Speculation Question
The assertion that any body of knowledge will be one day capable of solving the acute problems of society is a reassuring one. One can certainly draw comfort from figurational sociology's promise of a control to come. In the long run, social science will have developed tools that will facilitate in the creation of more effective political strategies (more effective than a politics built upon the foundation of the present day, not sufficiently detached social sciences). Such optimistic clairvoyance, a clairvoyance which posits the future as the proof of its politics, must, however, at some point deliver upon its promise for it not to be found wanting. Put differently: in order for figurational sociology's prophecies to be seen as sound, the future must one day come and this future must bring with it figurational sociology's much anticipated,
continuously promised yet frequently postponed coherent political position. If such a position is not eventually achieved then all talk of detouring via detachment will have necessarily amounted to nothing.
Figurational sociologists believe that the day of a politically oriented social science will eventually come, even if only in a facilitative role. But this belief, like so many other beliefs as to how the future will be, is not and cannot be supported by empirical evidence. Certainly, this particular belief is informed by faith in the idea that the trends of the past will continue into the future. But there are no absolute guarantees that these trends will actually continue into the future. One can either believe that they will continue, or one can believe otherwise. Advocates of figurational sociology, for their part, choose the path of optimism. Pessimists, it seems, are to persuade themselves as to the virtues of patience. Insight into the form which the future politics of figurational sociology, facilitative or otherwise, will assume will be given in the long term. Until then it seems that pessimists are required to believe, along with figurational sociologists, that the detour via detachment is one worth taking.
Such a take on politics certainly demands something akin to a leap of faith. My second question, then, is the following: in the final analysis, how do figurational sociologists know, without any doubt, that the detour via detachment will be ultimately worth taking? I say without any doubt because figurational sociology must be certain that benefits are to be found in taking the detour via detachment in order to justify its present day political silence. This is not a criterion which I am imposing onto figurational sociology. It is, as has been shown, rather the very manner in which figurational sociology judges itself insofar as its tendency towards social evaluation and manipulation is concerned. It is only because politics (or any sort of social intervention) is held as being a long term concern that figurational sociologists eschew present day social policy.
The Implementation Question
As has been shown, Elias repeatedly affirmed his outright reluctance to name the issues which the sociologists of the future would eventually address; his followers seem quite content to follow suit. In this sense, it is very difficult to speak of the politics of figurational sociology other than to say that they are of a derivative nature.
We do not even have much material at our disposal with which we might fathom a guess as to what figurational sociology's politics might eventually be like, so consistent are its representatives on this very point. All of this because the politics of figurational sociology are intentionally concealed in conscious anticipation of rigorous scientific data, out of which a politics might then be constructed. Social science will not, indeed cannot, be directed by non-scientific values. Detached investigation must precede any sort of practical intervention.
Assuming for now that figurational sociology's proposed separation between autonomous and heteronomous values can actually be made in a non-contradictory manner, the need to consider the transition from a stage of description towards a stage of implementation must be embraced at some stage. In simultaneously putting the problems of intervention's content, save 'control', off for another day and through insisting that intervention's form will be such that it will be capable of 'solving the acute problems in society', it is necessarily implied that at some point, somebody will have to take figurational sociology's politics seriously.
But in explaining the social world, the sociologist does not automatically form a natural disposition towards controlling it. Explanation and control are two distinct and separate tasks. Belief in the contrary does not make the contrary the case. The will to intervention must be inaugurated before it can be practiced. That being the case, there
has not yet been such an inauguration done in the name of figurational sociology.
Neither in Elias's work, nor in the work of his followers, have the many serious challenges consequential to the sociologist's transition from observer to controller/control facilitator, a transition directly implied by their writings, been adequately addressed.
My third question, therefore, is two-fold and of a primarily tactical orientation. On the one hand, what will be the institutional framework that will grant to figurational sociology the position which it sees as necessary to itself insofar as control facilitation is concerned? On the other hand, how will this position be obtained and secured by figurational sociologists? I wonder whether we are to take Elias's version of a social utopia, as laid down within his interview with Peter Ludes, as indicative in this regard.
If so, this third question would then focus upon the question of whether such a utopia is itself worth striving towards. If not, this third question would then focus upon the need for a consideration of how figurational sociology's ideals are to be implemented.
The Justification Question
The fourth question I want to ask has already been posed, in a round about way, by the work of Arnason (1987 , see also Bogner 1987 can all seemingly agree that control is that which the social sciences should eventually strive towards?
As Arnason (1987: 450) detrimental to sociology's existence. And yet, when we study the matter more carefully, we find that in seeking the possibility of social control and naming it as an eventual goal, the very elements excluded from the sociological edifice become its most basic, constituent parts. These questions simply cannot be avoided, in other words. Either a case is to be made for why control is an autonomous value of sociology. Or else control is to be constituted as a value heteronomous to sociology, and dismissed accordingly.
The Contradiction Question
The final question I want to raise returns to the discussion invited by Stephen Mennell with which this section opened. Within this particular piece, Mennell was responding to the point raised by Hans Haferkamp (1987a Haferkamp ( , see also 1987b Fletcher, 1997; Goudsblom, 1977; Goudsblom and Mennell, 1998; Mennell, 1998; Mennell and Goudsblom, 1998; Smith, 2000 and van Krieken, 1998 , also see esp. Mennell, 1977 pace Merton, 1936 Secondary involvement is itself a way towards creating the possibilities of appropriate interventions. The will to action undeniably exists but it is temporarily suspended for the sake of sufficiently developing the proper capacity towards intervention. Elias's position on the potential malleability of society was done in the name of a sociology that does not presently exist. But, as has been shown in this paper, these sociologists to come will at some stage have to engage with moral and political questions if they hope to implement moral and political controls. On this unresolved issue, an issue which Elias doubtless recognized yet simultaneously denied, a lot of work is to be Towards which Mennell (1991: 187-8) responds by saying:
I do not believe, pace Pels, that the research of those sociologists influenced by Elias proceeds without reference to and engagement with other intellectual standpoints…I wonder whether the openness of the 'Eliasians' to ideas from many other disciplines, and the total absence of sociological chauvinism among them, is something that gets up the noses of more narrowly discipline-proud sociologists?
5. For Richard Kilminster, the very fact that figurational sociology gives pride of place to a consideration of politics should not really be that surprising. As he argues
There is a forgotten 'evaluative' dimension, born in the German tradition of the sociology of knowledge. It has its origins as a moral-political strategy, a wager for a strong scientific sociology as a counterweight to the spiraling social and ideological conflicts of the 1930s. Sociology can evaluate the feasibility, credibility and desirability of reform programs put forward by political groups and in political ideologies and illuminate the roots of conflict. At the same time, coming from this tradition it means almost certainly that Elias takes it for granted, hence does not always bother to keep repeating, that sociology can be comparative, empirical inquiries into real societies, also significantly reframe so-called 'ethical' questions posed by philosophers. It is thus obvious that Elias is no practitioner of any simpleminded 'value-free' sociology (1991: 173).
Elsewhere Elias argues:
No doubt a long-term perspective demands a greater capacity for distancing oneself for a while from the situation of the moment. But it also opens the way towards a greater detachment from the wishes and fears of the moment, and thus from timebound fantasies. It increases the chance of a more fact-oriented diagnosis (1987b: xv).
And:
At present the emphasis on short-term forecasting threatens to stifle basic or longterm research and theory building in sociology…We need more basic research into the largely unknown human universe, in order to find out why things have happened, and why they are happening today (1998: 149-50).
7. As well as the challenge being recognized as significant, the stakes are believed to be nothing short of grand. Consider:
Galileo is still remembered as an exponent of the struggle of physics for autonomy from powerful extra-scientific ideals, in that case particularly the religious type. As far as can be seen, representatives of sociological theories, and indeed of theories in the human sciences generally, are as yet hardly aware that an analogous struggle for autonomy lies ahead of them. But in their case the principal fight for emancipation has the character of a struggle for autonomy from the political and social ideals of the day (Elias 1987a: 225) .
As Helmut Kuzmics insists:
In addition to self-coercion, which has been forced upon the individual from outside, Elias has always stressed the importance of self-control. Socialization under civilised conditions uses up a lot of time and other resources. Elias has often been criticised as if his image of man were purely reactive, as if his model of socialisaion only involves conditioning through fear and coercion and leaves no room for the pleasures of learning. This sweeping judgment is misguided (1987: 523).
9. Cas Wouters (1987: 426) traces the expression back to a series of lectures Elias gave at the University of Amsterdam during 1970 Amsterdam during -1971 10. In another interview, this time with Johan Goudsblom, Elias again gestures towards the necessity for sociologists to play their hand in controlling social processes:
It is necessary to form a theory so that, in the future, we may be able to judge more closely what kind of restraints are required for complicated societies to function and what type of restraints have been merely built into us to bolster up the authority of certain ruling groups. What I have done is not enough, it is only one step. We must find out more about it. We do not know. I do not believe that we can live entirely without restraints, as some communes today try to do. But I firmly believe that the ways in which restraints are built in today are wasteful and uneconomical (Elias 1998: 145) .
11. This is obvious from the text of the interview itself. Micael Björk (2005: 58) suggests that within this particular interview:
Elias asserted that intellectuals should stimulate a detached involvement in the body politic. He did not think that intellectuals were everything, but he thought that in a period of crisis they could make a difference, 'backed by a wide public opinion to make governments think twice' (Elias, 1984: 287) .
